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ABSTRACT
This paper examines what industrial organization economists know and
don't know about how markets clear. It reviews the empirical evidence
which shows that, at least for some industries, price behavior is peculiar
with prices failing to adjust over long periods of time. The paper dis-
cusses several existing theoretical explanations for the peculiar behav-
ior such as fixed cost to changing price information asymmetries and
theories of dynamic oligopoly. The paper goes on to develop some new
theories to explain the observed behavior. The new explanations rely
heavily on the importance of a seller's knowledge of his customers and
on the optimality of non-price rationing. The paper discusses what re-
lation, if anything, macroeconomics has to industrial organization.
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Chicago, IL 60637I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial organization is the study of how individual industries
operate. It attempts to explain how an industry reaches an equilibrium
price and output and how the industry behaves over time in response to
changes in either supply or demand conditions. As is typical in micro-
economics, an important focus of attention has been on how price clears
markets. Industrial organization, perhaps more than any other branch of
microeconomics, has been well aware that the observed behavior of prices
turns out to be different from that predicted by any of the simple models
of market clearing. Despite this disparity between the evidence and the
theory, industrial organization has not, until quite recently, made great
strides toward resolving the conflict. This essay describes some of the
simple as well as more recently developed and more complicated theories
of how markets clear, and presents evidence on what industrial organiza-
tion economists know about how markets clear.
Aside from industrial organization economists, macroeconomists are
also deeply interested in the question of how markets clear. In Keynesian
macroeconomics it is assumed that for some (often unexplained) reason
certain markets, typically the labor market, do not clear because a price
is rigid. When prices fail to clear markets, inefficiencies develop,
resources are wasted and unemployment can arise. If industrial organ-
ization economists find that certain prices are rigid, that fact should
be of great interest to Keynesians since their theories depend on these
price rigidities. Whether or not one is a Keynesian, understanding how
markets clear over time is valuable information to a macroeconomist. If
industrial organization economists can indeed predict the time path of-2-
prices, output, investments, the employment of factors, and inventories,
and the transmission of shocks from one sector of the economy to the
other, those predictions would be of interest to macroeconomists at-
tempting to explain business cycles. Recent explanations of business
cycles (e.g., Lucas (1981)) stress the importance of intertemporal sub-
stitution patterns, either in demand or in supply. It is these
intertemporal substitution patterns that industrial organization econo-
mists can help describe.
Much of the recent work in macroeconomics emphasizes the importance
of information transmission in the economy (e.g., Lucas (1981)). For
example, some current explanations for unemployment and business cycles
depend upon individuals having difficulty obtaining information about the
economic environment from their own observations of the marketplace.
These theories, which stress the role of information, owe a great debt
to Stigler's initial analysis (1961) of market behavior when search costs
are positive. Recent advances in the theory of finance have emphasized
how well-organized competitive auction markets, like a stock market, can
facilitate the aggregation of information (see, e.g., Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)). This paper will explain that auction markets and search
markets are just two of many possible types of market organization, each
of which have different properties of information transmissions. This
means that if industrial organization economists have theories to predict
which type of market organization will develop and how information gets
transmitted in each type of market organization, they could assist
macroeconomists in pinpointing those sectors of the economy where infor-
mation lags and information errors are most likely to occur.—3—
One possible reason why macroeconomics has not paid more attention
to industrial organization is that much of industrial organization seems
fixated on answering how the behavior of markets differs as industry
concentration changes. Although this is certainly an interestingques-
tion, industry concentration is only one of many ways in which markets
can differ. Market liquidity, heterogeneity of product, variability in
demand and supply, the ability to hold inventories, and the ability to
plan are also interesting characteristics, and differences in these
characteristics lead to different market behavior. Yet the effect of
these other characteristics has received much less attention from indus-
trial organization economists than the effect of differences in industry
concentration. And the effects of differences in these other character-
istics may well be of more importance to macroeconomists than the effects
of differences in concentration. This essay will discuss some of these
other characteristics.
Although it is clear that industrial organization does have some-
thing to offer macroeconomists, it is unlikely that macroeconomists who
study industrialorganizatjon will suddenly realize that they have been
overlooking key insights into macroeconomics. One reason is that the
attempt within the last ten to fifteen years to provide a rigorous
micro-foundation for macroeconomics already represents interaction be-
tween industrial organization and macroeconomics. Another reason is that
industrial organization has only recently been making progress in areas
of potential interest to macroeconomists. My own assessment is that some
of these new areas of research, which I describe below, do have thepo-
tential to provide a valuable contribution to macroeconomics. However,
the contributions will probably be better characterized as sharpening the-4-
perspective of macroeconomists rather than as fundamentally changing how
macroeconomists think. 1
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some simple
theories of how markets clear. These simple theories focus on price as
the mechanism used to achieve resource allocation and investigate how the
price clearing function is altered depending upon whether the market is
a competitive one, an oligopoly or a monopoly. Section III provides ev-
idence on what industrial economists know about price behavior. The ev-
idence is sufficiently at variance with any of the predictions of the
simple theories that it raises serious questions about the usefulness of
these theories for explaining price behavior in many markets. Section
IV investigates a variety of alternative theories that go a good way,
though not all the way, toward explaining some of the observed puzzles
in the data on price. In particular, I present a general theory of how
markets operate without relying upon price as the exclusive market
clearing mechanism. In Section V1 I focus on features of market structure
other than the degree of market concentration to show how market structure
matters in explaining the response of various industries to shocks in
either supply or demand. Section VI presents my conclusions.
1.I do not discuss the concept of money and credit. Even here, a few
industrial organization economists have done some work that might
interest macroeconomists. See, e.g., Telser and Higginbotham (1977)
and Telser (1978) ch. 10. I also do not discuss the political theory
of regulation (Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976)) which might be used
to explain fiscal and monetary policy.-5-
II. SIMPLE THEORIES OF HOW MARKETS CLEAR
In this section, I. briefly survey the three most important simple
models of how markets operate. These simple models form the background
against which I will analyze the evidence on prices in the next section.
Although these models are admittedly simple, it is first necessary to
understand where the simple models fail in order to develop better models.
A.Competition
Probably the simplest and most frequently used model to evaluate
industry behavior is the standard competitive model in which price adjusts
so as to equate supply to demand. This model assumes that there is a
well-functioning auction market in which transactions take place. There
is no cost to using such a market nor is there uncertainty affecting
suppliers or demanders.
The focus of the model is to explain price fluctuations as the
mechanism to clear markets. Given the standard assumptions of a perfectly
competitive model, it is straightforward to trace out how the market re-
sponds to shifts in either supply or demand. For example, we can write
in equilibrium that
D(P;a) =S(P;a) (1)
where D is the demand curve, S is the supply curve, P is the price, and
a represents exogenous factors influencing supply or demand or both. We
can rewrite equation (1) in logarithmic form as in equation (2)
in D(ln P;ln a) =inS(ln P;ln a) (2)-6-
where in a =logof exogenous factors. We can perform comparative statics
on equation (2) to figure out how price will change in response to fluc-
tuations in a. It is straightforward to show that the percentage change
in price resulting from a one percent change in exogenous factors will




where Eelasticity of supply (Es) or demand (ED).
The insights from the competitive model usually stop with (3). This
means that the analyst, once he knows the elasticities of supply and de-
mand, is done. He uses equation (3) to predict the price effects using
the price elasticities. Typically not much attention is paid to the
economic explanations of the likely magnitude of Es or ED, based upon the
economic motivation of firms and individuals.
The competitive model is elegant in its simplicity and in its pred-
ictions. When either demand or supply changes, price adjusts to clear
the market. The amount by which price has to adjust depends solely upon
the supply and demand elasticities. There are no unsatisfied demanders
at any instant nor any sellers who wish to sell the good but cannot. All
sellers receive and all buyers pay the same price, and price changes are
perfectly correlated across different buyers.
B. Oligopoly Models
It has long been recognized that the competitive model will fail if
there are only a few firms in the marketplace and if these few firms
recognize their mutual interdependence. In such a situation, the industry-7-
supply curve will no longer equal the summation of the marginal cost
curves of the firms. Instead, the amount one firm is willing to supply
depends, in part, on the reactions that the firm thinks its rivals will
take to its actions. There is no one model of oligopoly behavior that
is uniformly accepted today. This inability to develop a single model
reflects in part ignorance, but also the fact that oligopolies differ
quite a bit in their behavior, and therefore it is unrealistic to expect
one model to completely describe their behavior. Most simple models of
oligopoly (e.g., Bertrand, Cournot, kinked demand curve) assume that
however price is set, there are no unsatisfied demanders or sellers at
that price, that price changes are passed along to all buyers simultane-
ously, and that it is not costly to transact in the market.
One common theme of most models of oligopoly is that the behavior
of price in an oligopoly will be much different than it is in a compet-
itive market. This insight is useless, though, unless it is possible to
describe the types of differences one expects. One early attempt was to
use the model of the kinked demand curve to explain oligopoly pricing.2
As shown in Figure 1, under the kinked demand curve theory of oligopoly
pricing, every firm faces a demand curve that is much more elastic above
a price, p. and much less elastic below that price. If firms do face such
demand curves, it is clear that there will be a tendency for firms to
price at p for a range of different marginal costs. The marginal cost
curve will go through the gap in the marginal revenue curve. (See Figure
1.) The kinked demand theory of oligopoly behavior therefore predicts
that prices will tend to remain unchanged for small changes in costs.
2. Other recent models yielding kinked demand curves include Salop









Unfortunately, the theory is silent on how price initially gets set.
The kinked demand curve is certainly not a theory to explain price levels.
At best, it is a theory to explain why prices do not change in response
to moderate shifts in cost. (In response to large shifts in cost, the
theory predicts that prices should change, although it provides no
guidelines as to how the new price level will then be set.)
The property of the kinked demand curve that price is unresponsive
to some cost fluctuations is preserved in most discussions of oligopoly
theory whether or not based on the kinked demand curve. The reasoning
is that in oligopolies prices fluctuate less in response to cost changes
(especially small ones) than they would otherwise in order not to disturb
existing oligopolistic discipline. Anytime a price change occurs in an
oligopoly, there is a risk that a price war could break out. Hence, firms
are reluctant to change price.
C.Monopoly
The theory of monopoly like the theory of competition is exceedingly
simple. The firm calculates its marginal revenue curve and equates mar-
ginal revenue to marginal cost. Again, the simple theory of monopoly does
not typically analyze how the shapes of either the demand curve or mar-
ginal cost curve will be influenced by economic motivations facing con-
sumers or the firm. The implication of the theory of monopoly is that
price will exceed marginal cost. Again, as in the models of competition
and oligopoly, there are no unsatisfied demanders at the market price,
and the cost of allocating goods, that is the cost of using a market price
to allocate goods, is assumed to be zero. The demand curve is assumed- 10-
tobe known and price changes across different buyers are expected to be
highly correlated.
It is straightforward to use the simple theory of monopoly to explain
how a monopolist will react to shifts in either supply or demand. For
example, if marginal costs change, then the new price will be determined
by the intersection of the new marginal cost curve with the marginal re-
venue curve.
It is common to see statements that a monopolist will have his price
vary less than it would if the market were competitive. This intuition
seems to be based upon an example in which demand curves are linear. In
such a case any change in marginal costs will be translated into a change
in price that is less than the change in marginal costs. For example,
if the demand curve equals
Q9-P (4)
and marginal cost equals 1, the optimal price is 5. If marginal cost
rises from 1 to 3, the optimal price goes up from 5 to 6. That is, price
rises by one-half of the cost increase.
With linear demand curves and constant marginal cost, it is easy to
show that if costs are changing over time, then the resulting variance
in cost will be greater than the variance in price. However, it is also
possible to construct models with precisely the opposite property. For
example, suppose a monopolist faces a demand curve with a constant
elasticity of demand and has a constant marginal cost. Then the
monopolist's price equals a constant mark up above marginal cost. Since
the mark up exceeds 1, it follows that the variance of price will exceed— 11—
thevariance in marginal cost. For example, if the elasticity were two,
the monopolist would be charging a price of $2 if marginal cost were $1.
If marginal cost were to rise by $2 to $3, the optimal price would rise
by $4 and become $6. The increase in price would exceed the increase in
cost.
The previous examples show that the relationship of price changes
to cost changes varies with the shape of the demand curve and therefore
it is not possible to make any general statements about the variance of
price in relation to the variance of cost based upon whether a market is
competitive or monopolized. Moreover, since we know that oligopolies run
the spectrum from almost competitive industries to almost monopolized
industries, the simple theories do not allow any differential predictions
of price flexibility for (large cost changes) that depend solely on the
degree of competitiveness of the market.3
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF
PRICE IN ALLOCATING GOODS
Several types of evidence are available to enlighten economists on
the role that price plays in clearing markets. One type of evidence is
casual observation which, although not terribly scientific, is better
than no observation at all. Another type of evidence relies uponsurveys
of prices paid, as best they can be measured, for different commodities
and across time. We now review the evidence.
3. For small cost changes, the theory of oligopoly suggests that prices
may remain unchanged.- 12-
A.Casual Observation
Even if an economist has never studied the actual empirical dis-
tributions of prices across markets, he has transacted in many markets
himself. He knows that it is not unusual for him to go to the supermarket
to buy a product and for the supermarket to be out of that product. He
knows that if there are three cars ahead of him at the gas station, the
price of gasoline at the pump will not rise, but rather he will have to
wait to get his car filled up. In fact, for many items he commonly pur-
chases, the price, once set, stays fixed for a while.
Newspaper articles often describe how some companies have difficulty
assuring themselves of supply during periods of high demand. Histories
of business, such as Alfred Chandler's The Visible Hand, describe in de-
tail that many firms vertically integrate, not necessarily to get a lower
price for the product, but rather simply to get the product on a reliable
basis. Waiting for a good and being unable to purchase a good when one
wants it are typical rather than atypical experiences in many markets.
In periods of tight supply, preferred customers get delivery, while new
customers often are unable to assure themselves of a supply at the same
price as the steady customers. In fact, short-term customers may be un-
able to get the product at all.
The notion that emerges from these types of observations is that in
many markets price may not be the sole mechanism used to clear themarket.
None of the simple theories of Section II are able to explain the exist-
ence of unsatisfied demanders, yet, that fact appears to be an essential
feature of many markets.- 13—
B.Studies of Price Statistics
1)Early Studies
The earliest study that I am aware of regarding the flexibility and
behavior of prices is the one by Frederick Mills in 1927. Mills examined
numerous price statistics gathered by the BLS for frequency of change and
amplitude of change. His work represents an outstanding contribution to
our knowledge of price behavior.
In Figure 2, I have reproduced some of Mills' findings regarding the
frequency of price change over various time periods. The diagrams show
that the distribution across markets of the frequency of price changes
is U-shaped. That is, there are many products whose prices change fre-
quently, and many products whose prices change infrequently. I am unaware
of any attempt by economists to explain empirically the shape of these
functions. Of course, it is possible to say that in some industries there
is no need for price change, and what Mills is showing reflects simply
the distribution of shocks to various supply and demand curves. So for
example, there are many markets for which shocks are frequent, while there
are also many markets for which shocks are few. While that is one pos-
sibility, another is that there are some markets for which prices change
frequently and are the exclusive device used to clear markets, while there
are other markets for which price does not vary frequently and something
else is going on to clear those markets.- 14-
Figure2
COLUMNDIAGRAMS SHOWING DISTRIBUTIONS OF MEASURES OF
FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGE, BY PERIODS.1
Frequency
6O
1906-1913 1914-1921 1922-1925 i890-i92!
1914-I9ZF?
iTheclass intervals in which the x-acalea are graduated are given in Table 122.
Source:Mills (1927) p. 371
The horizontal axis measures frequency of
price change. Frequency increases as one
moves to the right.
30- 15-
Itremained for Gardiner Means in 1935 to create turmoil in the
profession by suggesting that the Great Depression occurred because in
many markets the laws of supply and demand had been repealed and prices
no longer fluctuated to clear the market. Whatever one thinks of Means'
arguments, they attracted widespread attention. Here was a man claiming
that the Great Depression, which was (and is) inexplicable to most econ-
omists, was caused by a breakdown in market clearing, which formed the
basis for all economists' beliefs. Keynes' general theory soon came along
with predictions of economic behavior that resulted from an assumed wage
rigidity. Although I have never seen any analyses of wage rigidity com-
parable to, for example, Mills work, my suspicion is that wage rigidity
is less important than price rigidity, and the reliance by macroeconomists
on wage rigidity strikes me as misplaced.4 In any event, Means hypotheses
challenged the profession and though, as I explain later, his inferences
from price rigidity are misguided, they are based on, what I believe, is
a correct phenomenon, namely that none of the simple theories explain
price behavior very well.
Means theory was that in many markets prices were "administered" --
whichmeant that the laws of supply and demand no longer predicted price
behavior, and instead prices were under the control of firms which, for
unexplained reasons, chose not to vary prices to clear markets. Means
claimed that price changes in "administered" markets were much less fre-
quent, and, when they did occur, much larger in amplitude than those in
competitive markets. According to Means, because administered markets
4. If prices are stickier than wages, real wages should be procyclical,
while if wages are stickier than prices, real wages should be
countercyclical. The evidence (see, e.g., Zarnowitz (1985)) is that
real wages are procyclical.- 16-
hadlong stretches of rigid prices, prices were failing to clear these
markets, and this failure caused the disequilibrium of which the Great
Depression is an example.
Means seems to have resisted equating administered prices to prices
in markets with high concentration, and there was confusion as to what
exactly an administered price was. A voluminous and contentious litera-
ture developed to try to give structure to Means' arguments and test
them.5 The resUlt of that literature has, I think, been to confirm that
something unusual is going on in the behavior of some prices. (See, e.g.,
Weiss (1977), but see Stigler and Kindahi (1972) for a different point
of view.)
Mills' (1927) earlier work, which attracted much less attention than
that of Gardiner Means, did not indicate a significant decrease in the
frequency of price changes from the 1890s to the mid-1920s (See Figure
2). Although I am not aware of any study that has redone Mills' analysis
on price flexibility for the period of the Great Depression, my hunch is
that prices did not become dramatically more rigid after 1929. That is,
Gardiner Means may well have been right to point out that economists had
inadequate theories to predict the flexibility of prices, but the phe-
nomenon he was talking about was one that was not confined to the period
of the Great Depression. Indeed, as we shall soon see, the phenomenon
of rigid prices characterizes the U.S. economy today. However, Means did
raise the possibility of a link between industrial structure and business
cycles --alink that is only now being explored.(See Section II.B.3.)
5.The interested reader is referred to Beals (1975), Lustgarten (1975),
Quails (1979), Scherer (1980), Ch. 13, Weiss (1977), and Weston and
Lustgarten (1974), and the references cited therein.- 17-
2)Later Studies
The major criticism of Means' work is that it relies on price sta-
tistics gathered by the BLS. A study done by McAllister in 1961 for a
Congressional Committee on Price Statistics showed that the BLS data
typically did not reflect price discounts. Moreover, an examination of
the way in which the BLS gathered price statistics showed that the number
of reporters relied upon by the BLS varied from market to market. It is
a simple statistical exercise to show that the more reporters there are,
the more likely it is to observe some flexibility in an average price.
This is especially true when products are somewhat heterogeneous. The
McAllister study showed that the flexibility of prices, as determined from
BLS numbers, was closely linked to the number of reporters taking BLS
surveys.
The findings of the McAllister study led to one of the most important
contributions to the debate on administered prices --thework by George
Stigler and James Kindahl (1970). Recognizing the inadequacies of BLS
price statistics, Stigler and Kindahi collected data on individual
transaction prices based on actual transactions between buyers and sell-
ers. Although the Stigler-Kindahl data undoubtedly contain reporting
errors, it is probably the best source of information on pricing behavior
available to economists today. Stigler and Kiridahl constructed indices
of prices for individual commodities, and found that their price indices
moved much more smoothly than those of the BLS. Price indices, when based
upon actual transaction prices, were much more flexible than the price
indices based on BLS data. Although Stigler and Kindahi did not explic-
itly claim that their findings were completely in accord with any of the
simple theories of market clearing, they did suggest that their work went- 18-
along way towards explaining the unusual findings of price investigations
based on BLS data. Their explanation was that the BLS data were simply
misleading.
Stigler and Kindahi did recognize that there were some puzzling
features even in their own data set. For example, they noted that the
typical pattern of buyer-seller behavior was for buyers and sellers to
remain in contact with each other for long periods of time even for
transactions involving what appear to be homogeneous goods. This suggests
that buyers and sellers build up some specific capital from the trans-
actions and that this capital is valuable and must be preserved over time.
As will be seen below, this insight can be used to explain a great deal
of what appears to be unusual pricing behavior. Furthermore, the Stigler
and Kindahi data produced a price index that was not only more flexible
than the BLS index, but also had a different general trend from the BLS
index during some time periods. For example, if one believes that the
BLS price is more of a spot price than the Stigler-Kindahi price index,6
which is based on long-term contract prices, then the Stigler-Kindahi data
suggest that over the course of the business cycle there are systematic
differences between how spot prices behave and how long-term contract
prices behave. During booms, spot prices rise relative to long term
contract prices. There have been only a few attempts to explain why such
differences exist.7
6. The BLS index is based on current price quotations for delivery.
Therefore, it is reasonable that the BLS index will reflect fewer
long term contracts than the Stigler-Kindahi index. (See Stigler-
Kindahi (1970), p. 6).
7.See Stigler and Kindahi (1970), Carlton (1979), and Hubbard and
Weiner (1986).- 19-
Anotherinteresting feature noted by Stigler and Kindahi is that most
of the transactions, although they last a long time and although they may
be pursuant to a "contract," seem to specify neither a price nor in many
cases a quantity. It is simply wrong to think of contracts as rigidly
setting both the price and the quantity terms in a market place.
(Williamson (1975) makes this same point.) That is, it is wrong to be-
lieve that it is the writing down of a fixed price contract that is
causing rigid prices in markets. Even if buyers and sellers had the op-
portunity to renegotiate after they have entered a deal, it will often
be the case that prices would not change in the contracts.
Gardiner Means (1972) responded to the Stigler-Kindahi study by
claiming that their evidence, instead of contradicting his earlier work,
actually supported it. Since it is very hard to define exactly what
Means' hypotheses were, it is not worth attempting to resolve this dispute
here. However, Leonard Weiss (1977) did attempt to weigh the evidence
of Stigler-Kindahl against the evidence put forward by Means. Although
recognizing the difficulty of giving theoretical content to Means' hy-
pothesis, Weiss concluded that the evidence on pricing did appear unusual
in the sense that the simple theories do not do a good job of explaining
pricing behavior.
The only other study using the Stigler-Kindahi data base is my own
(Carlton (1986)). Unlike Stigler and Kindahl, I did not construct indices
of prices to examine how a price index behaved over time because indices
can mask interesting behavior. For example, it is possible for an index
of prices to be perfectly flexible even if most contracts are character-
ized by rigid prices. This could occur if new buyers simply paid a dif-
ferent price than old buyers. Yet, it is surely important to know whether- 20-
priceis being used to allocate goods to some buyers while not to others
and whether some other mechanism, such as a seller's knowledge of each
buyer's requirements, is being used to allocate goods. Instead of exam-
ining indices, I examined how prices to individual buyers change relative
to each other during the course of a ten year period. I also analyzed
how often a price, once set to an individual buyer, changed.
Table 1 presents a summary of some of my findings. It shows
that the degree of price rigidity differs greatly across industries.8
In some industries the average price does not change for periods well over
one year, while in other industries the price changes quite frequently.
In fact, there are several instances of transactions in which the price
paid by a buyer does not change for periods of well over 5 years. Although
the evidence in Table 1 could conform to the simple theories under some
extreme assumptions, I think it is better viewed as casting doubt on them.
For example, one could argue that in industries with very rigid prices
the supply and demand conditions are virtually stable over time, while
in the other industries with flexible prices the supply and demand con-
ditions are changing frequently. I find that the duration of the rigidity
8. Rigid prices are troubling to an economist because they suggest that
prices may not be clearing markets. However, it is not rigidity per
se that should bother economists, but rather the inference from the
rigid prices that prices are not clearing markets. Even if prices
were perfectly indexed to inflation and hence were always changing,
it would still be troubling if the evidence (e.g., unsatisfied buy-
ers) indicated that price did not clear markets.
It is also important to understand that the simple models pre-
dict inefficient resource allocation when the marginal price fails
to clear markets. A contract that specifies a fixed quantity at a
fixed price is not a rigid price that can induce inefficiency since
the marginal price of an additional unit is the price of buying that
unit in the marketplace. When the quantity term is left open, as
appears to be the case for the Stigler-Kindahi data, the contract
price is the marginal price.- 21-
Table1

















Source: Canton (1986), Table 1.- 22-
insome prices to individual buyers is so long that this explanation is
not credible. And, further investigation (described below) reveals that
such explanations are wrong.
The Stigler-Kindahl data allow one to examine how price changes
across different buyers of the identical commodity are correlated. In
all of the simple theoretical models of market clearing, the price changes
across different buyers of the same commodity should be highly correlated.
Although there were some markets for which this was true, there were se-
veral markets in which price changes seem to be poorly correlated across
buyers. My interpretation of these results is that the simple models
which rely exclusively on price to clear markets simply fail to explain
how many markets operate. It is an unsolved puzzle to explain why price
changes in some markets are highly correlated across buyers, while price
changes in other markets are not.
One of the findings of this study was the strong positive relation-
ship between industry concentration and price rigidity. The more highly
concentrated an industry is, the greater is the likelihood that the in-
dustry has prices that remain unchanged for long periods of time. (Recall
that the simple models do not have any prediction relating price rigidity
to the amount of concentration in the market.9)
In summary, detailed examination of the Stigler-Kindahl data uncov-
ers a number of anomalies in price behavior. These anomalies do not
support any of the simple models of market clearing. As will be explained
9. Although the theory of oligopoly can justify price rigidity in the
face of small cost changes, notice that as the industry becomes more
concentrated and an oligopoly becomes more powerful, the oligopoly
should behave more like a monopolist for whom, according to the
simple theory of monopoly, prices should not be rigid.- 23-
inSection IV,Ithink it wrong to assert that these findings necessarily
prove that markets are operating inefficiently. Instead, these findings
prove that the simple models of price clearing are inapplicable to certain
markets.
3)Other Recent Studies
There have been numerous empirical investigations of the relation-
ship between price, cost, business cycles, and concentration.10 Although
I will not describe them in great detail here, I would like to call at-
tention to several recent studies that improve on earlier studies by using
more comprehensive data.
The work of Domowitz, Hubbard and Peterson (1986a, 1986b, 1986c)
examines the behavior of prices in the United States over the period 1958
to 1981 using data at the four digit SIC code level. They reached several
interesting conclusions. First, price-cost margins in concentrated in-
dustries are procylical --theyrise in booms and fall in recessions.11
Second, price-cost margins in relatively unconcentrated industries tend"
to be countercyclical. Third, unionization in concentrated industries
appears to keep wages in those industries relatively stable over the
business cycle.
Domowitz et al. explain their finding of procyclical margins in
concentrated industries by showing that costs, in particular real wages,
tend to be more rigid in those industries. That is, during a boom, a firm
in a concentrated industry experiences a price increase that is accompa-
10. The interested reader is referred to Chs. 9 and 13 in Scherer (1980)
for a survey of some of these studies.
11. Qualls (1979) also finds this procyclical effect.- 24-
niedby only a modest cost increase so that the gap between priceand
(marginal) cost rises. Unions provide one explanation for the greater
rigidity of wages in concentrated industries sinceunionization and con-
centration are positively correlated. Domowitz et al. find that the
differential degree of unionization (not just concentration) is an im-
portant explanation for this procyclical behaviorof margins in concen-
trated industries. A corroborating piece of evidence is that localdemand
effects are less important than aggregate economic activityin explaining
margins. This is exactly what one would expect if price changeswere
relatively similar across industries but not cost changes sothat dif-
ferences in cost were the main variable explaining differentbehavior of
margins across industries during the business cycle.
This finding of procyclical margins in concentrated industriesis
interesting for what it implies about how concentrated marketswork. A
monopolist (or an oligopolist trying to behave like a monopolist)will
have his price-cost margin rise only if the elasticity ofdemand changes.
I have not seen any evidence to suggest that demand elasticitiesdecrease
in booms.12 Therefore, some other explanation is needed to explain pro-
cyclical margins in concentrated industries. Possible explanationscould
rely on either oligopolistic behavior (e.g., incentives to cheat,(see
Section IV) or the long-term relationship of the buyer or seller (see
Section IV).
There has been some work that reaches opposite conclusions to those
of DomowitZ et al. For example, Scherer (1980), ch. 9, in reviewingthe
literature concludes that margins in concentrated industries are likely
12. clearly, all demand elasticities cannot decrease because ofthe
"adding up" constraint on the demand elasticities.- 25-
tobe countercyclical. This view is based on studies that find slow ad-
justment of prices to cost changes in concentrated industries.
Another contradiction to the procyclical nature of margins comes
from the work of Bus (1985). He finds that marginal cost is procyclical
and that, in general, margins are countercyclical. He finds no effect
of concentration on this relationship; however, his investigation of the
concentration effect relies on fewer observations than does the work of
Domowitz et al. Bus takes special care to measure marginal as opposed
to average variable cost. In contrast, Domowitz et al. are forced to use
average variable cost in their measure of margins. If marginal cost is
rising, then the true margin (which is based on marginal cost) could well
be unchanging or even falling over the cycle, while Domowitz et al. would
measure an increasing margin. Whether this explains the discrepancy be-
tween Bus and Domowitz et al. is unclear, but it surely reconciles at
least part of the discrepancy.
A final piece of possibly contradictory evidence comes from Mills
(1936). Mills studied the behavior of margins during the period before
and after the Great Depression and found margins to be strongly counter-
cyclical. Although Mills did not investigate the relationship of margins
to concentration, his strong finding across all industries does contrast
with Domowitz et al.'s finding of a "tendency" for countercyclical be-
havior of margins and then only in unconcentrated industries.
Just as it is important to understand how markets in the United
States clear, it is also important to understand how markets in different
countries clear. There has been some work trying to describe the dif-
ferent price flexibilities among various countries. One of the best is- 26-
thework by Encaoua and Geroski (1984).13 They put together a detailed
data base that they used to estimate the relationship between price, cost
and concentration across a wide variety of countries and commodities.
They find, in general, that the higher the degree of concentration in a
market, the slower is the adjustment of price to cost changes.14 They
show that the more an industry is characterized by new entry and compe-
tition (measured by imports), the more likely it is that prices rapidly
adjust to cost changes. They also find that there is a difference in the
flexibility of price across countries with, for example, Japan having more
flexible prices than the United States. Understanding the reasons for
the differential flexibility of prices across countries remains an im-
portant task.
C.Summary of Evidence on Prices
The evidence on price reveals that some markets are well described
by the simple models of market clearing, but others are clearly not.
Markets differ greatly in how flexible prices are, with the degree of
competition being an important determinant of flexibility. In some mar-
kets, price changes to one buyer may be uncorrelated with those to another
buyer, suggesting that other factors, such as a seller's knowledge of a
buyer, are involved. In other markets, long-term relationships between
buyers and sellers appear to be important. This suggests that industrial
13. See also Gordon (1983).
14. The empirical findings of Domberger (1979) for the United Kingdom
are precisely opposite. Domberger's explanation of his results is
that information should be easier to gather as concentration in-V
creases and, so, prices should respond more rapidly to cost changes.
See also Eckard (1982).— 27-
organizationmust consider arrangements more complicated than those based
on impersonal markets in which prices alone allocate goods.
IV. HOW TO EXPLAIN THE EVIDENCE
There are several approaches to developing theories that better ex-
plain the observed evidence. (See Tucker (1938) for an early attempt.)
One approach is simply to think harder about the simple theories, improve
them, and see how far we can get. That approach takes us a good distance
and I will describe some of the most useful extensions to the simple
theories. However, those extensions to the theories get us only part of
the way and in the remainder of this section I explore alternative theo-
ries that are useful in explaining some, though perhaps not all, of the
evidence. It is the development of new theories of market clearing that
should receive priority in explaining the pricing anomalies and that could
have some impact on macroeconomic thinking.15
A.Extensions to the Simple Theory -
TheIntroduction of Time
The expositions of any of the simple theories stress price as the
market clearing mechanism and ignore the possibility of delaying con-
sumption or production to a later time. However, there is nothing in the
theory that prevents it from taking account of such intertemporal sub-
stitution. For example, it is a straightforward extension of the simple
15. I do not explore the importance of risk aversion in explaining price
rigidity. My empirical work (Carlton (1986)) indicated it not to
be important. The theoretical development of the effect of risk
aversion on pricing turns out to be identical to that in my 1979
paper. See Polinsky (1985) for a detailed study of risk aversion
and pricing. I also do not explicitly examine pricing under condi-
tions of natural monopoly. (See Hall (1984)).- 28-
competitivemodel to date goods and treat the same good at one date as a
different commodity than the same good at a different date. (See Debreu,
ch. 7, (1964).) Once dynamic elements are introduced in this way, it is
clear that the demander faces many substitutes to consuming a product
today, not only from other products consumed today, but also from the same
product consumed in the future. Conversely, from the viewpoint of the
supplying firm, the firm could substitute production today for production
tomorrow by holding inventories; in fact, the supply decisions of the firm
across time are based on a complicated decision problem of how to vary
inventories of inputs, capital, labor and final output inventories and
production in such a way as to satisfy a given stream of consumption.
These observations suggest that the intertemporal substitution patterns
of both consumers and firms will be critical to understanding the extent
to which prices today must adjust in order to clear markets.
The introduction of time into any of the three simple models de-
scribed in Section II makes those models more realistic descriptions of
the world. The introduction of time emphasizes the importance of
intertemporal substitution on both the demand side and the supply side.
We now describe how each of the three simple theories gets altered by the
introduction of time.
1) Competition
By employing the simple device, described above, of dating commod-
ities, it is straightforward to introduce time into the analysis of com-
petition. In this analysis, each commodity at each separate date is
regarded as a distinct commodity that is related in both supply and demand- 29-
toall other commodities. The most important new relations areamong the
identical physical commodity over time.
The demand curve for a product at a particular point in time depends
upon consumerst perceptions about what the price of the product will be
in the future. If consumers are not impatient about consuming the prod-
uct, then the price today cannot deviate very far above the price expected
to prevail in the future without inducing consumers to cease purchasing
today. That is; the elasticity of demand (ceteris paribus) will be very
high. Similarly, on the supply side intertemporal substitution will af-
fect the willingness of firms to supply the product today at a given
price. Firms will recognize that an alternative to producing and selling
today is to produce and sell tomorrow, or perhaps to produce today, hold
the good in inventory and sell it tomorrow. The recognition that a firm
can decide on the optimal time path of production and the optimal em-
ployment of factors of production, one of which is inventory, will affect
the shape of the short run marginal cost curve (ceteris paribus).
A competitive equilibrium will involve a separate price for each date
at which the commodity will be consumed. Anything that changes either
the cost of producing today or in the future or the demand today or in
the future will affect the entire vector of prices over time. This means,
for example, that a shock to demand today might well affect the price of
the good not only today but also in the future. This raises the possi-
bility that shocks to supply or demand today will be absorbed primarily
by something other than prices today. In fact, it is quite conceivable
that in response to only slight changes in the vector of prices in the
future, consumers will significantly rearrange their consumption of the
good over time. In such a case, increases in demand today may not in-- 30-
creaseprice today by very much, but rather leave most prices today and
into the future unchanged, but simply shift consumption from today to the
future.
The important insight from this way of viewing competition is that
even though prices are clearing markets, the necessary equilibrating
price changes can be quite small. It will be quantity shifts among dif-
ferent goods (i.e., the same good consumed at different periods of time)
that will bear the brunt of the adjustment and not price.
If there are large shifts in the timing of when goods get consumed
as demand and supply conditions change, the data should reveal large
swings in delivery lags (the lag between the placement and shipment of
an order). Many markets do seem to be characterized more by fluctuations
in delivery dates than by fluctuations in price. For example, in Table
2 I have calculated the variability of price and the variability of de-
livery lags for several major manufacturing industries. As the table
shows, the variability of delivery lags swamps the variability in
price for many industries. This evidence is consistent with the theory
we have just outlined of competitive market clearing. The insight of the
theory is that the price fluctuations that flone expects to clear markets
may well be lower than that predicted by the simple model that ignores
the importance of the time dimension.
The importance of delivery lags as a market clearing device, in ad-
dition to price, has not been extensively studied. Zarnowitz (1962, 1973)
appears to have been the first to stress the importance of delivery lags
as a market clearing phenomenon. (See also Maccini (1973) and Carlton
(1983).) In Carltori (1985b), I estimated the importance of delivery lags— 31—
Table2
Price and Delivery Lag Fluctuations
Standard Median
Standard Deviation Delivery
Deviation of log of Lag
Industry oflog of Price delivery lag (months)
Textile Mill .06 .17 1.26
Products
Paper and Allied .05 .08 .46
Products
Steel .03 .25 1.95
Fabricated Metals .03 .18 3.06
Non-Electrical .04 .25 3.63
Machinery
Electrical .05 .10 3.86
Machinery
Source: Canton (1983a) Table 1.- 32-
asa determinant of demand. Those estimates are reproduced in Table 3.
In conjunction with Table 2, the results imply that for many markets the
fluctuations in delivery lags are approximately as important to the
equilibration of demand and supply as are fluctuations in price.
There have been several studies that estimate the time path by which
firms adjust factors of production in an attempt to meet fluctuations in
demand. These studies (see e.g., Nadiri and Rosen (1973), Haltwanger and
Maccini (1983) nd Topel (1982)) explicitly recognize that firms can vary
inventories, labor, price and other factors of production to achieve their
desired sales. These studies of intertemporal substitution in production
provide us with a better understanding of the shape of the (ceteris
paribus) marginal cost curve at any instant in time. Obviously, if it
is costless to store inventories, prices will tend to be stable. If
prices were not stable, there would be an incentive to hold inventory to
speculate on any expected appreciation in price.
Some recent work by Mills and Schumann (1985) has investigated the
determinants of how flexible firms make their production technology.
Since the flexibility of production technology is an endogenous decision
(see Stigler (1939)), an understanding of this endogenous choice of
flexibility will enable the analyst to better predict the likely supply
responses that are available in the short-run to help meet changes in
demand conditions. Mills and Schumann have uncovered what appears to be
a systematic difference between small firms and large firms. They found
that small firms have more flexible production technologies than large
firms. If true, this would suggest that the industries in which entry
of small firms is difficult will be less able to expand production during
booms than industries with no such difficulties.- 33-
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Source: Carlton (1985b).- 34-
Insummary, the introduction of time into the simple competitive
model goes a good way toward explaining how markets may respond to shocks
without the analyst ever observing large changes in current prices. In-
stead of large price changes, there may be large shifts over time in
quantities consumed or produced as either firms or consumers take advan-
tage of intertemporal substitution.'6
2.Oligopoly
The introduction of time affects oligopoly models for many of the
same reasons I have already discussed in the competitive model. That is,
the ability of consumers to substitute across time periods as well as the
ability of firms to produce the good across different time periods will
affect how the market responds to changes in the underlying conditions
of supply and demand. Some recent work has shown that the introduction
of time adds a new element to the analysis of oligopolies that is lacking
in the analysis of static oligopoly or dynamic competition. The key in-
sight is that firms in an oligopoly are playing a game with each other
16. An analysis that recognizes the quality of goods is conceptually the
same as one involving time. If goods are described by a vector of
characteristics, q, then in response to a perturbation in either
supply or demand conditions, not only will the price of the good
change, but the quality of the good, q, will change. (See Rosen
(1974).) Again, this raises the possibility that, within the context
of a perfectly competitive model, adjustments to demand or supply
shocks can occur through changes in q as well as through changes in
price. Although it appears that delivery lags are one of the most
important quality components of a good that seem to fluctuate, there
may well be others, depending upon the particular commodity. For
example, in response to an increase in the demand for bus transpor-
tation during rush hour, a city may put on more buses, but each bus
may be much more crowded than during non-rush hour. That is, a less
desirable product has been substituted and prices have remained un-
changed.— 35—
overtime. They are attempting to send each other a signal about the
likelihood of successful collusion.
Firms cannot communicate directly because of the antitrust laws, and
therefore, any one firm has uncertainty about whether his rivals are ac-
tually coordinating their policies with him or, instead, are cheating and
stealing away his customers. One way for an oligopoly to behave is for
all firms to agree to charge a high price; however, whenever cheating is
suspected, all firms in the industry cut price as punishment for some
fixed period. This type of model, developed and refined by Porter (1983)
and Green and Porter (1984), suggests that oligopolies will go through
price wars. The oligopoly during good times will be characterized by high
and stable prices; however, when demand starts falling for the industry,
some industry members will mistakenly think that their downturn in demand
is caused by rivals secretly cheating on the cartel price and taking
business away from them and will cut their price as punishment. This
suggests a theory in which prices fall during downturns because of a
breakdown in oligopolistic coordination.
As Stigler (1964) pointed out, a breakdown in oligopolistic coordi-
nation is more likely to occur the greater the "noise" in the economy.
Inflation increases the "noise" in the economy by making real prices more
uncertain (see Vining and Elwertowski (1976).17 Therefore breakdowns in
oligopolistic discipline should be more common during times of rapid price
change.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) reach a different conclusion. In their
model, oligopolies behave more competitively in booms. The reason is
17. See Carlton (1983a) for a discussion of the effects of inflation on
market behavior.- 36-
that,in their model, the gains from cheating on any non-competitive price
are greater during a boom. Since the gains from cheating can be lowered
by a lowering of price, oligopolists consciously choose a relatively low
price in booms to deter cheating. The theory suggests that the margins
of oligopolists should behave countercyclically, rising in lean years and
falling in boom years.19
For these theories of oligopoly to have macroeconomic implications,
one must presume that economy-wide fluctuations simultaneously affect
many industries and account for significant fluctuations ineach indus-
try's fortunes. For example, these theories might be especially relevant
during the Great Depression when the common large shock of a downturn in
demand simultaneously affected a wide spectrum of the economy. Whether
such theories of oligopoly are helpful in explaining cyclical behavior
during the more moderate business cycles after World War II remains to
be seen.
3)Monopoly
The introduction of dynamic elements into the study of monopoly
raises the same issues about intertemporal substitution in demand and
supply discussed above for competition. There is one additional element
though that arises in the case of monopoly (or perhaps a cooperating
oligopoly) but not in the case of competition. A monopolist is concerned
not only with the influence of today's price on demand today, but also
with its influence on future demand. For example, an increase in the
18. Rotemberg and Saloner (1985) have also explored how their model can
help explain some unusual empirical facts on inventory holdings over
the business cycle.— 37—
priceof steel scrap may lead some steel producers to alter their plans
for building a new steel furnace, and this will, in turn, affect the fu-
ture demand for steel scrap. To the extent that consumers adjust their
future behavior in response to price changes today, a monopolist will take
that adjustment into account in setting price. In contrast, a competitive
firm has no control over its price today or in the future, and therefore
cannot respond to the incentives to influence future demand. This rea-
soning explains why a monopolist might not want to raise price for fear
of inducing substitution away from his product in the long-run. This
suggests one reason why prices in a monopoly may be more stable over time
than in a competitive industry.
A monopolist who can hold inventory takes account of the relation
between the marginal revenue curves at different points in time in setting
his price. By taking account of these interactions, the monopolist is
lead to choose a more stable price policy than the simple models of mo-
nopoly would suggest. (See, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1983), Blinder
(1982), Phlips (1981), and Reagan (1982).)
To the extent that consumers are uncertain about future prices, a
monopolist might use his pricing path as a signal to tell consumers what
price they should expect in the future. This means that, if costs rise
unexpectedly in the short-run but the monopolist knows that the increase
will be only temporary, the monopolist might be reluctant to raise his
price and pass these temporary cost changes on to consumers for fear that
they will mistake the current price increases as being permanent and react
to them in the long-run by substituting away from the product. Therefore,
a monopolist has an incentive to absorb temporary cost changes so that- 38-
theprice charged today might be a good indicator to consumers of the
price to be charged in the future.
B. Fixed Costs of Changing Price
If there is a fixed cost that must be incurred every time a price
is changed, the firm will not continuously vary price as predicted by a
simple market clearing model under either competition or monopoly. In-
stead, price once set will remain fixed until the new price exceeds the
old price by an amount sufficient to justify incurring the fixed costs.
(See Barro (1972) for a development of a model along these lines.)
This theory clearly accounts for nominal price rigidities, but, to
be believable, requires an explanation of the source of these fixed costs
of changing price. For example, it may cost money to publish a new cat-
alog, print a new menu, or remark items already on the shelf. In a setting
where the firm sells many products, it might well be more costly to change
price than in a setting in which only a few products are involved. For
example, grocery stores sell many products one of which is cigarettes.
It is not uncommon for a pack of cigarettes of one size, say regular, to
sell for the same price as a pack of cigarettes of another size, say, king
size, even though the wholesale price of the two packages to the indi-
vidual store differs. One rationale for the common retail price is that
the difficulty of training a clerk to recognize different prices for
different packages of cigarettes would induce too much error into the
process of checking out. Instead, price differences tend to be taken into
account only when larger packages, such as cartons of cigarettes, are
sold. Therefore, the probability of observing price differences on dif-- 39-
ferentsized cigarettes increases when the quantity purchased in a single
transaction is larger.
Aside from the cost of having to relabel prices on items or send out
new catalogs or print up new menus, there is another reason why a firm
might be reluctant to change price and act as if it faced a fixed cost
of changing price. Some customers will settle on a firm to buy from only
after they have engaged in a search in which they have compared the price
of this firm to' the price in the rest of the market. As long as the
customer believes nothing has changed, the customer will remain with the
initially chosen firm. If the customer interprets a change in price by
the firm as a signal that market conditions have changed, then that cus-
tomer may well decide to search in order to investigate whether his chosen
firm still remains the optimal supplier for him.
In Carlton (1986), I tabulated the minimum observed price change
across a wide variety of products sold at the intermediate level of man-
ufacturing. If the fixed costs of changing price are high, then small
price changes will tend not to occur. I have reproduced in Table 4 the
minimum price changes observed. Table 4 shows that for the large majority
of commodities examined the minimum price changes are quite small. The
evidence is that small price changes occur in many transactions and sug-
gests that, at least for some transactions, the fixed cost of changing
price is small.19 A theory that postulates a uniform fixed cost to change
19. I use the word "suggest" because it is possible that I am observing
small price changes only when the new supply and demand conditions
are expected to persist for a long time. The evidence could then
be consistent with a significant fixed cost of changing price that
causes prices to remain rigid for temporary shifts in supply and
demand, but not for permanent ones. Although this explanation is
possible, I have seen no evidence to suggest it to be true.- 40
Table 4




Percent of PriceChanaes Less Than
1/4% 1/2% 1% 2%
Steel Annual .04 .08 .11 .27
Quarterly .05 .11 .17 .24
Monthly .09 .20 .36 .52
Non-Ferrous Annual .02 .05 .09 .27
Metals Quarterly .02 .05 .12 .25
Monthly .08 .15 .28 .49
Petroleum Annual 0 0 .08 .24
Quarterly 0 0 .02 .17
Monthly .01 .05 .19 .47
Rubber Tires Annual .12 .21 .30 .44
Quarterly .07 .11 .18 .34
Monthly .13 .23 .38 .63
Paper Annual .04 .09 .08 .27
Quarterly 0 .19 .24 .33
Monthly .13 .23 .43 .62
Chemicals Annual .04 .08 .13 .24
Quarterly 0 .05 .11 .24
Monthly .05 .14 .30 .42
Cement Annual .14 .22 .32 .46
Quarterly 0 0 .01 .19
Monthly .71 .75 .85 .94
Glass Annual 0 0 .07 .19
Quarterly 0 0 .20 .40
Monthly .03 .20 .45 .67- 41-
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Source: Canton (1986), Table 3.- 42-
pricesimply does not square very well with these facts.2° A theory that
predicts a different fixed cost to different customers could, of course,
explain the facts but then one would have to explain the source of the
differing fixed costs among different customers. This is in fact the
approach taken by the recently developed theory of market clearing which
is described in part D of this section.
Whether or not there is a common large fixed cost of changing price
to individual buyers, the evidence in Section III shows that for many
markets prices do not change, at least in the short-run. In such a set
ting, the market behavior will deviate considerably from those of any of
the simple models. The new feature of models with a temporarily fixed
price is that consumers run some risk of not being satisfied in their
demand. The notion that consumers may find a product unavailable simply
has no counterpart in the standard theory. Yet unavailability of a
product is surely a fact of life and is one that our economic theories
should deal with.
One of the early contributions to this literature on fixed prices
and product availability is the work by Edwin Mills (1962). Mills exam-
ined the behavior of a monopolist who must set price and produce before
he observes demand. The optimal inventory policy for the monopolist is
to choose output in such a way that the expected price equals marginal
cost. The expected price will equal the price charged times the proba-
bility that a customer will come to the firm. It is easy to show that
20. It is possible to set a a price policy that specifies price as a
function of certain variables. Price could then change when the
underlying variables changed. My evidence cannot be used to deter-
mine if there is a substantial fixed cost to changing the price
policy.- 43-
theinventory holding policy of the firm depends on the mark-up of price
above cost. The closer is price to cost, the smaller will be the inven-
tory of the firm, and conversely the higher the mark-up of price over
cost, the larger will be the inventory of the firm. The reason is that
the incentive to hold inventory declines as the mark-up falls because the
profit from making a sale falls while the cost of getting stuck with un-
sold goods remains unchanged. What is interesting about this relationship
is that the probability of stock-outs, that is shortages, increases as
markets become more competitive.
Models analyzing the availability of goods in competitive markets
have been developed in the work of Carlton (1977, 1978, 1985a), DeVany
and Saving (1977), and Gould (1978). In these models, consumers value a
firm not only for its pricing policies but also for its inventory policy.
The commodity space now is not simply a good at a particular period of
time, but rather a good consumed at a particular point of time with some
probability. Inventory policy affects the probability that the firm will
have the good available. Some consumers will prefer to shop at high-
priced stores that run out of the good infrequently, while other consumers
will prefer to shop at stores that charge low prices but may run out of
the good more frequently.
Once it is realized that a firm must stock an inventory to satisfy
customers, it should be obvious that the variability of consumers' demand
for the product will affect the firm's costs. The cost function of the
firm depends upon the demand characteristic of consumers. The simple
separation between supply curves and demand curves is lost in these more
complicated models.- 44-
Ifthe consumers' variability of demand influences the firm's cost,
firms will want to charge different consumers different prices based on
their respective variability of demand. These price differences do not
reflect price discrimination, but cost differences. Prices to consumers
will differ as long as consumers have a different variability of demand
from each other, even though each consumer consumes the physically iden-
tical product. This means that prices to one consumer could change at
the same time that prices to another consumer remain unchanged. The re-
sult would be a low correlation of price changes across consumers -- a
finding that characterizes many markets (Section III).
C.Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
It is common in economic transactions that a buyer has different
information than a seller. For example, when someone buys a house, the
buyer generally knows less about the house than the seller who has lived
there for a long time. When someone buys a share of IBM stock, he may
know less about IBM than other investors who are employed by IBM. Does
the introduction of this kind of asymmetric information affect how markets
reach equilibrium? In 1970, George Akerlof showed that the answer to this
question was a resounding yes. He showed that with asymmetric information
equilibrium no longer requires supply to equal demand. Moreover, not only
does asymmetric information affect how prices are set, asymmetric infor-
mation can also cause markets to vanish completely.
Akerlof used a simple example to illustrate his point. Consider a
market in which buyers are purchasing used cars that differ in quality.
A buyer knows nothing about the quality of a particular used car and only
knows the quality of the average car sold. The seller on the other hand- 45-
knowsexactly the quality of his used car. At any price, p, an owner is
willing to sell his car only if the value of the car is less than or equal
p. If only cars whose quality is valued at p or less are placed on
the market, then the average quality of cars offered at price p will be
valued at less than p. But if the average quality of a car offered at p
is not valued to be worth p, the price will fall. A simple repetition
of the argument shows that no matter how low the price falls, the average
quality offered' in the marketplace will never be valued at the stated
prices This causes the market to vanish entirely. That is, not only does
the price mechanism not clear the market, there is rio market left to
clear. This collapse of the market can occur even though there may be
buyers and sellers who, in a world of perfect information, would find it
mutually beneficial to transact with each other.
It is possible to extend Akerlofs model to show how equilibrium can
involve either excess demand or supply. (See, e.g., Stiglitz (1976,
1984).) For example, suppose a firm wishes to hire a worker of a par-
ticular skill level. The firm obviously wants to pay as little as pos-
sible for such a worker. However, if the firm advertises a low wage, the
people who apply for the job are likely to be low quality workers. The
higher the wage rate offered, the higher the average quality of the ap-
plicant.21 Therefore, when firms have difficulty measuring worker qual-
ity in advance, it might be sensible for the firm to set a sufficiently
high wage in order to attract more than one applicant for the job. Al-
though the firm would like to pay a lower wage for a given quality worker,
21. The average quality rises with the wage because higher quality
workers (in addition to the lower quality workers who applied at the
lower wage) apply as the wage rises.- 46-
thefirm realizes that if it lowers its wage, only lower quality workers
will apply for the job. Equilibrium, therefore, involves setting a high
wage and having an excess supply of labor.
Akerlof's model can be recast as a problem in the principal-agent
literature. In that literature there is a principal who hires an agent
to perform some task. The principal can only imperfectly observe the
agent's action. The problem that the principal-agent literature ad-
dresses is how to design the best contract given the constraints of
asymmetric information. For example, in Akerlof's automobile example,
the buyer could be regarded as the principal and the seller the agent.
The seller's decision to sell the car is based on the car's quality which
is unobservable to the buyer. The problem in Akerlof's model is that as
the price of a car falls, the agent, that is the seller, is able to respond
by choosing to withdraw the higher quality cars from the market.
Akerlof's model has been extended to a variety of circumstances using
the principal-agent analogy. For example, Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) have examined the market for loans. They observe that when
a bank makes a loan, the bank is unable to perfectly monitor the riskiness
of the investments that the borrower puts the money into. One response
of a borrower to a higher interest rate might be to take on riskier
projects. There are instances when a bank is unwilling to raise the in-
terest rate in the face of excess demand for loans for fear that the in-
creased interest rate will drive borrowers to pursue riskier projects to
the disadvantage of the bank. Therefore, the bank might be content to
refuse to make additional loans rather than raise the interest rate. This
is an example in which asymmetric information leads to an equilibrium in
which supply does not equal demand and in which there is a rigidity in a- 47-
pricevariable, namely the interest rate. In short, asymmetric informa-
tion creates incentives for adverse selection (only bad workers showing
up for a low paying job), and for moral hazard (borrowers choosing riskier
investments in response to higher interest rates), and can, as a result,
lead to either the disappearance of markets or to market equilibrium in
which supply does not equal demand and in which there are rigidities in
the relevant price variables.
D.Toward A General Theory of Allocation22
1)It is Costly to Create a Market that Clears by Price Alone.
The key feature which most theories of market clearing ignore is that
it is costly to create a market in which price equates supply to demand.
In the standard theory, we usually assume that there is a fictional
Wairassian auctioneer adjusting prices to clear markets. But in fact
there is no such person. The markets that probably come closest to the
textbook model of competitive markets are financial markets, such as fu-
tures markets. A moment's thought will reveal that it is costly to run
such markets. Aside from the actual physical space that is required,
there is the time cost of all the participants who are necessary to run
the market. For example, at the Chicago Board of Trade, the floor trad-
ers, the employees of the brokerage firms, as well as the members of the
associated clearinghouses, are all working together to produce a suc-
cessful futures exchange. The people who use these futures markets must
somehow pay all the people who work either directly or indirectly in
22. The theories in this section are developed in detail by Canton
(1987). See also Okun (1981) and Williamson (1975).- 48-
makingthe transactions of customers.23 These payments from the customer
to the market makers can take several forms, such as direct commissions
or simply bid-ask spreads.
Another important cost of making markets is the time cost of the
actual customers. (See, Becker (1965).) It would be very inefficient
to have a market in which customers had to spend large amounts of their
own time in order to transact. The purpose of a market is not merely to
create transactions but rather to create transactions at the lowest cost.
Once one recognizes that the creation of markets is itself a pro-
ductive activity that consumes resources, it makes sense to regard the
"making of markets" as an industry. There has not been much research on
the "making of markets," (see Canton (1984)), but just like there is
competition to produce a better mousetrap, so too is there competition
to produce better and more efficient markets. The New York Stock Exchange
competes with the American Stock Exchange; the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change competes with the Chicago Board of Trade, and so on.
Lest one think that it is easy to create a successful futures market,
one need only consult the historical record. I have presented in Table
5 the average failure rates of new futures markets based on evidence
from the United States. The table indicates that about 40 percent of all
futures markets fail by their fifth year. The making of successful mar-
kets is a risky activity, and as the exchanges themselves well know, it
is hard to predict which markets will succeed and which will fail.
23. Markets benefit non-users too by providing price information. This
creates a free-rider problem.- 49-
Table5
Death Rates of Futures Markets
Age Probability of Dying at the







Source: Carlton (1984) Table 5.- 50-
Organized24spot and futures markets exist for only a handful of
commodities. Since we know that there are definitely social benefits to
the creation of markets and since at least some of these benefits can
probably be privately appropriated, the paucity of organized markets em-
phasizes that it must be costly to create them.
2)Heterogeneity Is An Important Characteristic
Of Determining How Markets Will Clear
The heterogeneity of the product is perhaps the most critical char-
acteristic in determining whether a market will clear by price alone.
If buyers have different preferences for when they want to transact, what
they want to transact (that is, the particular quality of the good), or
where they want to transact, it is unlikely that a successful market can
be organized that clears by price alone. Attempts to create an organized
market in the face of widespread product heterogeneity will simply lead
to an illiquid market that cannot support the cost of having the requisite
number of traders. (Telser and Higgenbotham (1977)).
Since product heterogeneity within an industry is an endogenous
characteristic, the industrial organization economist should be able to
predict which markets are likely to be sufficiently homogeneous so that
an organized market can exist. For example, suppose each buyer is pur-
chasing a standardized product. Each buyer is deciding whether he should
continue purchasing the standardized product or whether he should cus-
tomize the product to his own taste. The advantage of customizing will
depend on how idiosyncratic the buyer's needs are. The disadvantage is
24. I use the term "organized)' to mean auction markets that clear by
price alone.- 51-
thatthe buyer is forced to transact in a less liquid (higher transaction
cost) market. The greater the benefits from custom designing a product
to one's own specifications, the less likely it will be that a market can
be created that will clear by price alone. Indeed in the extreme case,
in which every buyer demands a slightly different product, it will be
impossible for buyers to trade with each other and the incentive to create
an organized market will be small.
3)How Do Markets Clear If There Is No
Organized Market?
When an organized market does not exist, it is not possible for the
firm to discover (costlessly) the market clearing price, and the firm must
rely on something else to figure out how to allocate its products to
buyers. There are a wide variety of mechanisms other than the auction
price mechanism that can be used to clear the market. One alternative
was discussed by Stigler in his article (1961) on search theory. In
Stigler's model, there is no organized market in which price equates
supply to demand. Instead, buyers must search across different sellers
in order to discover prices. Buyers' search costs become the resource
cost of operating the market.
The notion of firms posting prices and consumers searching across
firms is only one of many ways in which markets can function. An alter-
native is for firms to hire salesmen whose task it is to become know-
ledgeable about the demands of individual customers. Even if it is
difficult for the firm to set the market clearing price, it may be pos-
sible to identify those customers who should obtain the goods (i.e., the- 52-
efficientallocation of goods).25 The firm could use price to identify
those buyers who want the goods the most, and then could use a second
screen, based on the firm's own internal knowledge of each buyer's needs,
to decide which of the remaining buyers should receive the goods. So,
for example, it would not be uncommon during tight supply situations for
steady customers to get delivery while new customers stood waiting. It
would also not be unusual to see buyers and sellers entering long-term
relationships so that the sellers could better understand the buyers'
needs and vice versa.
The importance of price diminishes once one recognizes that price
alone may not be not clearing markets and, instead, that price in con-
junction with other mechanisms, such as a seller's knowledge of a buyer's
needs, is performing that function. Indeed, if price is not the sole
mechanism used to allocate goods, it becomes less interesting to observe
whether price remains rigid. Although a rigid price does imply an inef-
ficiency under any of the simple models in which price alone is the ex-
clusive mechanism used to achieve efficient resource allocation, a rigid
price does not imply inefficiency in a world in which price is but one
of the many methods firms are using to allocate goods to customers.
A theory that combines price with non-price methods of allocation
would have the following implications.26
25. An example may help. Imagine that a firm, with a capacity of 100
units, has only two buyers who are known to be identical. If the
firm is supply constrained (i.e., each buyer's demands are high at
the stated price), then the efficient allocation is obvious (50-50),
but the market clearing price is not. (See Carlton (1983a, 1987)
for more details.)
26. Additional implications regarding behavior during periods of price
controls, speed of price adjustment, and behavior of price indices
are discussed and tested in Carlton (1986 and 1987).- 53-
a)The longer the buyer and seller have dealt with each other, and
therefore the better they know each other, the less need there is to rely
on price to allocate goods efficiently. A seller's knowledge of a buyer's
need can be a substitute for an impersonal (auction) market that clears
by price alone.
b)The length of time a buyer and seller are doing business with
each other becomes a characteristic of the transaction and can make one
buyer differentfrom another from the viewpoint of the seller. Therefore,
observing differences in the price movements to different buyers who are
purchasing the identical physical commodity may reveal nothing about
allocative efficiency, since prices for different "products" should be
expected to move differently from one another. The evidence in Section
III that indices of spot prices and long-term contract prices do not al-
ways move together is consistent with this implication, as is the evidence
that the correlation of price movements across buyers of the same product
is often low.
c)The pattern of a buyer's demand over the business cycle or,
alternatively, the covariance of one buyer's demands with those of other
buyers, will be a characteristic of interest to the seller. Again, even
though two buyers purchase the identical commodity, they may be charged
different prices and have their prices change differently simply because
they have different buying patterns over time. The evidence on different
price movements for different buyers of the same product is consistent
with this observation.
d)Rapid turnover of customers will inhibit the use of long-term
relationships in which a seller's knowledge of customers is used to al-
locate goods. Industries with significant new entry or with customers- 54-
withlittle "loyalty," should rely on price as the primary mechanism to
allocate goods.
e)The establishment of a new futures market will disrupt the
traditional pricing policies of existing firms in the industry. These
firms should be expected to complain about the introduction of the new
futures market. If the allocation of goods is a productive activity that
requires resources, then a futures market acts as a "competitor" to the
marketing department of firms in the industry. Futures markets create
marketing information. Without futures markets, other agents, such as
brokers or salesmen, must create this marketing information and get com-
pensated for doing so. If a futures market is established, there is in-
creased competition in this marketing arena and the value of marketing
skills declines. Therefore, it is natural for those firms who were suc-
cessfully performing the marketing function, before the introduction of
the futures market, to complain about the increased competition in this
activity.
There is some evidence of hostility towards the creation of new fu-
tures markets from the affected industry's members. For example, the
aluminum futures market was established in the late 1970s. Aluminum
producers opposed their establishment (American Metal Market, Jan. 6,
1978, p. 9). If marketing requires money, one possible interpretation
of the complaints of the aluminum companies is that the resources they
have invested to market their product are now competing with the resources
of a futures market to market the product.- 55-
E.Summary of New Theories
The development of theories of allocation that use methods in addi-
tion to price alone to clear markets is in its infancy. These theories
hold promise of explaining many of the puzzling features of price behav-
ior.27 They also may explain why these features of price behavior emerge
from what is (at least privately) efficient behavior.
Macroeconomists have studied the properties of information trans-
mission in search markets and have based theories of unemployment and
business cycles on these properties. (See, e.g., Lucas (1981).) Search
markets, as I have described, are just one of many ways to allocate goods.
The method chosen to allocate goods will influence how information gets
transmitted, as well as how markets respond to various shocks. For this
reason, the study of how markets clear is one to which both industrial
economists and macroeconomists should look for valuable insights into
where information lags are likely to occur in the economy and how various
industries are likely to respond to shocks.
V. MARKET STRUCTURE MEANS MORE THANJUST
OF CONCENTRATION
Industrial economists often examine how market behavior differs as
concentration in the market changes.28 However, as the preceding section
27. They may also be useful in explaining some of the empirical puzzles
associated with purchasing power parity, such as why prices (ex-
pressed in a common currency) of identical products in two different
countries seem to differ when exchange rates change.
28. This experiment only makes sense if concentration in a market is an
exogenous variable. Recent research has suggested that concen-
tration is an endogenous variable and is influenced by the relative
efficiency of firms. (See, for example, Demsetz (1973), Peltzman
(1977)). See Schmalensee (1985) for a different viewpoint.)- 56-
madeclear, there are many other features of market structure that matter
a great deal in explaining how markets behave, and, in particular, how
markets will respond to shocks in either supply or demand. For example,
we saw in the previous section that market operation will be significantly
influenced by the ability of consumers and suppliers to substitute over
time, and by the reliance the market places on price to allocate goods.
Studying the importance of features other than market concentration may
lead industrial organization economists to develop insights that are
useful to macroeconomists. In this section, I discuss two illustrations
of market characteristics that influence an industry's responses to
shifts in either supply or demand.29
A.Whether an industry holds inventories, and
B.whether the industry has a fixed price in
the face of random demand.
A. Produce to order versus produce to stock.
There are two basic ways an industry can be organized. It can wait
for orders to come in (produce to order) and then produce, or it can
produce first, hold inventories, and then hope to sell the products
(produce to stock).3° Although I have not seen much research on this
topic, I expect that our economy has increased its reliance on industries
29. Other illustrations include the incentives the industry has to plan
(Canton (1982), the degree of vertical integration, Carlton (1983a)
and Wachter and Williamson (1978)), the importance of new products,
Shleifer (1985) and the effect of search, Lucas (1981), and Diamond
(1982).) Each of these features affect how an industry responds to
shocks.
30. See Zarnowitz (1973) and Belsley (1969).— 57—
thatproduce to stock versus produce to order, especially with the growth
of the service sector in recent times.
An industry that produces to stock will be able to satisfy customers
quicker, and be able to take advantage of economies of scale more than
an industry that produces to order. On the other hand, an industry that
produces to order will be able to economize on inventory holdings of the
final good (though not necessarily of inputs), will be able to custom
design products.. to closely match the buyers specifications, and will
perhaps be induced to adopt flexible technologies to compensate for its
inability to hold inventories of the final output. The need to cut or
raise prices significantly in order to clear markets will be greater in
produce-to-stock industries than in produce-to-order ones. Moreover, the
transmission of shocks will depend on whether the industry produces to
stock (i.e., hold inventories). If either firms or final consumers are
holding inventories, a temporary increase in demand will be at least
partially accommodated by a decrease in inventory which, next period, will
lead to an increase in production. If inventory holding is not occurring,
the increase in demand may only drive current price up with little, if
any, increase in production in the current or subsequent periods. Work
by Amihud and Mendelson (1982) has shown how the recognition of inventory
holding can justify a Lucas-type aggregate supply equation.
B.Transmission of Shocks in Industries with
Fixed Prices
Suppose an industry is organized as described in Section IV B and
that prices once set don't change for some period of time. The production
of the goods must occur before demand is observed and therefore there is
some risk that firms will run out of the good. It is straightforward to- 58-
showthat the ratio of inventory to average demand will depend on the
ratio of price to cost (see e.g., Canton (1977)). The reason is that
the opportunity cost of a lost sale rises with prices, so that the in-
centive to hold inventories increases with price. If price exceeds cost
by a large amount, the amount of goods produced will exceed the amount
demanded on average. A contrasting case would be one where price is close
to cost so that inventory on hand is small relative to the average level
of demand. In this second case, stock-outs will be frequent.
It is possible to show that in response to a mean-preserving increase
in the riskiness of demand, firms will increase their inventory holdings
in the first case, while firms will decrease their inventory holdings in
the second case. In the second case, stock-outs become more frequent.
Firms that operate with little extra inventory will not be able to cushion
demand shocks. Therefore, when prices are temporarily unchanging, an
economy is more vulnerable to disruption (i.e. stock-outs) from shocks
the more competitive it is (i.e. the closer price is to marginal cost).
There has recently been interesting work linking aggregate macroe-
conomic activity to models involving fixed costs of price changes.31 (See
e.g., Akenlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985) and Blanchard (1985).)
These papers make the interesting point that the need to adjust prices
may be less important for the firm than for the economy as a whole. The
reason is that firms are assumed to have market power so that there is a
gap between price and marginal cost. Even if a change in price does not
raise the firm's profits significantly it could, in this second best
world, significantly raise consumer welfare. This point is related to
31. See also Dreze (1975), Fischer (1977), Hall (1978), Malinvaud (1979),
Rotemberg (1982), and Phelps and Taylor (1977).- 59-
theone in public finance that in a second-best world, small shifts in
one market can have significant welfare effects if price does not equal
marginal cost in other markets. See e.g., Harberger (1971). Therefore,
there may be a divergence between a firm's incentive to incur a cost to
change price and society's incentive to do so.32
VI. SUMMARY
This essay..has presented a survey of what industrial economists know
about how markets clear. The evidence on price behavior is sufficiently
inconsistent with the simple theories of market clearing that industrial
economists should be led to explore other paradigms. The most useful
extensions of the theory will be those that recognize that marketing is
a costly activity, that an impersonal price mechanism is not the only
device used to allocate goods, and that price methods in conjunction with
non-price methods are typically used to allocate goods.
Exactly what macroeconomists can learn from all this is less clear
to me. Since both macroeconomists and industrial economists are inter-
ested in the same question of how markets clear, I have no doubt that
there is the potential for the two groups to influence each other's re-
search. Whether that potential is realized depends in part on how some
of the new areas of research in industrial organization develop.
32. A closely related point is that in the presence of distortions be-
tween price and marginal cost, the value of an output expansion can
be greater to society than to the firm. See Harberger (1971). Hart
(1982) applies this principle in a macroeconomic setting.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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